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1 Introduction
The results achieved in recent years by the theory of product di¤erentiation may
well explain its increasing relevance in the analysis of industrial organization and
in the study of the sources of market power. The theory rests on the idea that in
the presence of a di¤erentiated demand, the strategic interaction among …rms
develops along two lines: the prices charged and the characteristics chosen by
a …rm and its competitors. One of the most investigated topics in this …eld is
the analysis of locational equilibria in a horizontally di¤erentiated market. The
horizontal Hotelling model has been widely used in order to discuss problems
related to the spatial price competition, the optimal product attributes, the
optimal plant location, etc., and has found applications in the spatial economics
literature, as well as in trade and banking theory. These models primarily
focus on the existence of a Principle of Maximal or Minimum Di¤erentiation
(Economides 1986). This existence problem amounts to asking whether the
interplay between the structure of consumers’ preferences for the di¤erentiated
product and the optimal strategic behaviour of …rms results into too little or
too much product diversity.
Following Hotelling (1929), D’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) es-
tablished a Principle of Maximal Di¤erentiation, by assuming that the intensity
of consumer preferences for their ideal product may be reformulated in a loca-
tional setup in terms of quadratic transportation costs: in a duopoly market,
the …rms try to set up apart from each other - di¤erentiate at most their product
- in order to relax price competition. This …nding sharply contrasts with the
acclaimed Principle of Minimum Di¤erentiation of the original Hotelling model
where …rms, in the presence of linear transportation costs, choose to cluster in
the product space. Examples of the tendency for competitors to reduce di¤er-
ences in distance or in the product characteristics space can be easily found in
the real world. Conversely, examples of maximal di¤erentiation can be identi-
…ed in a truly locational perspective - e.g. the attitude for shopping centers and
supermarkets to locate outside the urban center - but it is much more di¢cult
to observe maximal di¤erentiation in the characteristics space. The existence
of a greater or a lower di¤erentiation clearly depends on the interplay of a price
competition e¤ect and a demand e¤ect: when the latter prevails, the …rms’
strategies are found to exhibit a strong tendency towards agglomeration in the
middle; by contrast, when the demand e¤ect is outweighed by the price compe-
tition e¤ect, moving away is the optimal behaviour. Recently, this debate has
been extended to cover situations with ’low’ demand (Hinloopen and van Mar-
rewijk 1999, Chirco, Lambertini and Zagonari, 2000) and to multi-dimensional
models (Caplin and Nalebu¤ 1986, Neven and Thisse 1990, Tabuchi 1994).
One common property of traditional locational models is the assumption that
consumers are uniformly distributed over the characteristics space; with a few
exceptions, the situations in which the consumers’ preferences are concentrated
on a subsection of the available varieties have been neglected. In these cases one
would expect that competitors produce fairly similar types of products, in order
to better match the tastes of the relatively largest share of consumers (Beath and
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Katsoulacos 1991). The problem of the optimal prices and locations has been
explicitly solved by Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) with a triangular and symmetric
distribution. They show that, given that distribution, any symmetric location
around the middle cannot be an equilibrium. Indeed, two asymmetric equilibria
arise, characterized by strong product di¤erentiation between the …rms, with
one of them locating outside the support of the customer distribution.Their
results, however, heavily depend on the non di¤erentiability of the consumers
density function, which generates a discontinuity of the reaction functions in
correspondence of any symmetric location.
In this paper, we aim at extending Tabuchi and Thisse analysis in two di-
rections. We o¤er a simple parametrization of the degree of consumers’ con-
centration around the middle - which include the uniform and the triangular
distribution as limit cases. This allows us to solve the price-location problem
as a function of the degree of consumers concentration. Within this setup, we
are able to show that a symmetric equilibrium exists, provided the density is
di¤erentiable at the center of its support. Moreover, we are able to give some
theoretical support to the idea that a higher concentration of consumers around
the center induces …rms to reduce the optimal product di¤erentiation. Finally,
we …nd that the asymmetric equilibria identi…ed by Tabuchi and Thisse may
arise for a lower degree of consumers concentration than that implied by the
triangular distribution and that these asymmetric equilibria may coexist with a
symmetric one.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the basic model
and discuss the simple parametrization of consumers’ concentration adopted in
the sequel. The explicit solution of the price-location problem is presented in
section 3. Some comments and concluding remarks are provided in Section 4.
2 The model
Let us consider a market for a horizontally di¤erentiated product, where the
population of consumers is normalized to 1. Consumers, indexed with x, are
distributed over the interval [0; 1] ; according to a density f (x;w), where the
parameter w that can be viewed as a concentration index of the consumers’
tastes. More precisely, the density f (x;w) is characterized as follows:
f (x; 1) = 1; for x 2 [0; 1]
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